WW2 · CHAPTER 1 ·
Appeasement and the road to WW2
Chapter 1 of The War Room — WW2, 1936–1945: “The Gathering Storm”
From 1936 to 1938 Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, backed Franco in the Spanish Civil War, annexed Austria and demanded the Sudetenland. Britain and France answered with appeasement, and at Munich in September 1938 they granted the Sudetenland rather than risk war, a price paid by Czechoslovakia.
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The map above is the world of Europe, March 1938 — The Anschluss.
Every state on the map that year: The world in 1938 · Europe in 1938.
Part of IB History: The Second World War →
SHORT EXPLANATION
In 1936 Adolf Hitler began overturning the settlement imposed on Germany after the First World War. German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland, and Germany supported Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Austria was annexed in early 1938; Hitler then demanded the German-speaking borderlands of Czechoslovakia. None of these moves brought an armed response from Britain and France. Each success encouraged another gamble, and German power grew while Europe was still formally at peace.
Britain and France hoped to prevent war and gain time to rearm by making negotiated concessions, a policy called appeasement. At Munich in September 1938 they gave Germany the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia’s fortified border region, without the Czechoslovak government present to consent. The bargain made sense if satisfying that grievance would end Hitler’s demands. In March 1939 Germany occupied Prague and seized the rest of a country without a German majority. Hitler’s ambitions plainly reached beyond uniting German speakers, and Britain responded with a guarantee to Poland.
The full story
In 1936, France had the military strength nearby to intervene when German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland. Britain and France protested, and the German move stood. Here was a breach of the postwar settlement that France had the means to resist. Why did it hold back?
The prospect of another European war carried enormous weight. Voters and statesmen remembered the industrial slaughter of 1914–18, and another general war seemed almost unthinkable. The Depression had weakened democratic governments while helping the Nazis turn resentment of the 1919 settlement into political power. Britain was still rearming, and France was unwilling to act without British support. Nor did the recent record of international cooperation offer much encouragement: the League of Nations had failed to stop Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Abyssinia. Governments considering resistance to Germany had to reckon with these weaknesses.
Now consider what the same events taught Hitler. German troops had entered the Rhineland, Britain and France had objected, and Germany had kept what it took. A quick, limited move could therefore put his opponents in a difficult position. By the time they agreed on a response, Germany might already control the territory in dispute; reversing the change would then require them to risk the war they wanted to avoid. Each challenge to the postwar order gave Hitler another opportunity to see whether opposition would lead to force. Intervention in the Spanish Civil War provided practical preparation too. The Luftwaffe tested aircraft, crews and tactics in combat, while Germany presented its expansion as a crusade against communism.
At Munich in 1938, Britain and France had a further reason to consider concession. Germany had absorbed Austria in March, and Hitler now demanded the Sudetenland. They regarded the proposed border change as defensible on ethnic grounds. If Hitler wanted to bring German-speaking territory into Germany, granting this demand might settle the dispute. Even if a wider conflict eventually came, postponement would give them more time to prepare. This was the case for concession, and its appeal depended on treating Hitler’s demand as a limited one.
Britain and France accepted that case. Czechoslovakia paid the entire price, losing its mountain fortifications, much of its industry and any say in its own fate. Consider what those losses meant for the bargain: the country facing German pressure had surrendered resources with which it could resist further demands. The hope of a lasting settlement rested on Hitler being satisfied with what he had received.
Germany’s seizure of Prague in March 1939 destroyed that hope. German rule was now extending over Czech territory beyond the German-speaking areas Hitler had claimed to seek. Appeasement lost its credibility, and Britain guaranteed Polish independence. The pressures behind the earlier concessions had been real, and leaders had still made choices whose consequences accumulated. Each unopposed revision strengthened Germany and weakened collective security—the ability of states to resist aggression together. By 1939, the argument had moved beyond adjusting a disputed border. Britain and France had to decide whether further conquest would be met with armed resistance.
FULL EXPLANATION
Appeasement as a genuine strategy
For Britain, delay offered more than an escape from an unpleasant decision. Its air defenses were weak, its empire required protection, and support from the self-governing Dominions was uncertain. The public remembered the First World War. France, meanwhile, depended on British support and had fragile domestic stability of its own. In these circumstances a settlement that postponed war seemed valuable. Time did bring improvements: between 1938 and 1940 Britain increased fighter production, extended radar coverage, and improved army readiness. But the other side gained time and resources too. Each concession weakened a potential ally and showed Hitler that threats could succeed. Historians distinguish the practical case for delay from the assumption that Hitler was a conventional statesman with limited aims open to negotiation. The seizure of Prague exposed a program of racial expansion. Munich addressed genuine British and French difficulties by imposing the immediate cost on Czechoslovakia, while leaving the later balance of power worse.
Deterrence, information, and credibility
A government that wants to deter an attack must be able to carry out its threat, communicate it, and make its opponent believe it. Military strength alone will not do the whole job. Near the Rhineland in 1936 France had clear superiority, yet German leaders correctly doubted that it would act without Britain. In 1938 divided cabinets and anxious publics again made Western threats less formidable than the powers’ formal strength suggested. Hitler learned to expect restraint and mistook it for a permanent condition. After Prague, Britain guaranteed Poland; his earlier successes made the change easy for him to dismiss. Past conduct had given him reason to discount a new declaration. Stalin drew a different lesson: excluded from Munich, the Soviet Union doubted whether collective security could protect it. The West prepared for the possibility of immediate war; Moscow feared being left to face Germany alone.
Key places on the map
On this day
Why it happened
Versailles and Nazi revisionism. Germany lost territory and military strength under the 1919 settlement. The Nazis used resentment of those terms to build support for expansion, falsely describing each breach as a limited correction.
Depression and political weakness. Economic crisis damaged moderate parties and helped the Nazis come to power. It also put pressure on British and French military spending, while making support for another major war harder to secure.
Memory of 1914–18. Voters and leaders remembered the mass slaughter of 1914–18. Postponing another war seemed worth taking risks, especially when more time could help their countries rearm.
Failed collective security. The League of Nations failed to enforce its responses to Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Abyssinia. Those failures showed how an aggressor could act while other states struggled to agree on enforcement.
THE TURNING POINT
Munich, 30 September 1938. The agreement at Munich gave Hitler reason to expect that pressure would win concessions. Stalin, whose government had been excluded, had reason to doubt a reliable Western front against Germany. Both conclusions helped make the Nazi–Soviet Pact possible.
What it changed
Czechoslovakia becomes vulnerable. Czechoslovakia’s border defenses lay in the Sudetenland. Losing them left the country exposed; Germany seized the rest in March 1939, gaining the Škoda arms works as well.
Stalin considers a German agreement. The Soviet Union’s exclusion from Munich added to its distrust of Britain and France. An agreement with Berlin came to look like a way to gain time and a security buffer.
Britain guarantees Poland. Britain’s guarantee to Poland after Prague made resistance to further expansion a clearer commitment. Hitler read it as another bluff, raising the danger in the next crisis.
DISCUSSION QUESTION — Britain and France could probably have stopped Hitler cheaply in 1936–38. Why didn’t they?
Stopping Hitler meant accepting the possibility of another mass war. Leaders faced economic pressure, divided opinion, and forces that needed more preparation; delay did give them useful time to rearm. They also treated his demands as disputes over particular borders. Hitler saw concessions as steps toward a larger racial empire, so the bargain they hoped would settle the dispute encouraged further demands.
An interesting fact
French intelligence believed that nearly 300,000 German troops were in and behind the Rhineland zone in March 1936—about ten times the actual number. Only about 3,000 soldiers crossed the Rhine bridges. Hitler later called the forty-eight hours after the march the most nerve-racking of his life. A familiar story holds that the troops had orders to retreat at the first French shot, but historians now doubt it.
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