Decolonization of Africa · CHAPTER 2 ·
Suez Crisis and North Africa
Chapter 2 of The Decolonization of Africa, 1945–1994: “The First Doors”
Libya became independent in 1951 and Sudan on the first day of 1956, and Tunisia and Morocco won independence from France the same year. In July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal; Britain, France and Israel won the opening battles of the Suez war but folded when the United States opposed the invasion.
WW2 is free in full, and chapter 1 of every atlas is free. A free account opens 3 more chapters a day. Starter, at $9 a month, opens all 21 with no daily limit — see the plans.
Free printable Decolonization of Africa study guide, sent by email ↓
The map above is the world of Africa, March 1956 — Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco.
Every state on the map that year: The world in 1960 · Europe in 1960.
Part of IB History: The Decolonization of Africa →
SHORT EXPLANATION
The first changes in the colonial map came along the Mediterranean. Libya, formerly an Italian colony, became independent in 1951 after the young United Nations could not agree which power should inherit it. On 1 January 1956 Sudan chose independence over union with Egypt, and that year Tunisia and Morocco also won independence from France. Egypt’s Free Officers had deposed the king in 1952. Their leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, would make control of the Suez Canal a test of the old empires’ authority.
In 1956 Britain, France and Israel won the opening battles at Suez, but American pressure helped force them to give up their gains. President Eisenhower feared a split in the West and a drift of Arab states toward Moscow; pressure on the pound and the withholding of emergency oil left Britain exposed. France meanwhile released Tunisia and Morocco and concentrated on Algeria, where a million settlers and the fiction that Algeria was France itself made compromise unthinkable. These decisions showed how much more than possession of territory would determine the future of empire.
The full story
The dispute over Suez began with a project upstream. After Washington withdrew its loan for the Aswan Dam, Nasser nationalized the canal in July 1956 so that its revenues could help pay for it. The decision also asserted Egyptian control over Egyptian territory. Britain and France saw a threat to their route to Asia, oil and remaining possessions, and to their standing as great powers.
Britain and France secretly planned an attack with Israel. Their forces quickly recaptured the canal zone, but holding it required a political and financial position they did not have. Eisenhower opposed the operation, and Britain depended on American support for sterling and emergency oil. As the pound came under pressure, the costs of continuing became intolerable and Britain folded within days. Strong armies had won ground; they could not make the enterprise sustainable against Washington’s wishes.
Nasser survived the military defeat and emerged a political victor. His defiance made him a hero of Arab and African nationalism, while Cairo’s radio carried the cause of liberation movements from Algeria to Angola. London had learned that a colonial adventure could endanger both its currency and its American alliance. British withdrawal quickened, while France pursued a different course in Algeria.
Tunisia and Morocco were protectorates with rulers of their own, and France could present their release as a diplomatic adjustment. Algeria was legally part of France and had a large settler population. Its loss raised a different question for the French state. Suez nevertheless changed the climate in which such choices were made. Harold Macmillan, Chancellor during the crisis, later became prime minister and told South Africa’s parliament three years later that “the wind of change is blowing through this continent.” The subsequent British retreat from Africa reflected, in part, the lesson that fighting to hold colonies could risk national ruin.
FULL EXPLANATION
Winning battles, losing the objective
At Suez, battlefield success and political success came apart. Israeli, British and French forces achieved most of their immediate military objectives, but they did not remove Nasser or restore lasting European control of the canal. Taking ground was only the first step. Keeping the result required a campaign Britain could finance and allies willing to support it. The United States opposed an attack concealed from Washington. It threatened a wider conflict and undermined Western condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in the same weeks. Eisenhower used financial pressure: Britain needed support for the pound and emergency oil, and without them faced currency collapse. Britain and France still had powerful armies, but could not use them against American opposition at a bearable cost. Nasser’s survival made the result more conspicuous to nationalists, while accelerating calculations that war debt and organized resistance had already set in motion.
Two protectorates and a settler colony
France could contemplate independence for Tunisia and Morocco partly because of the way it had ruled them. Both were protectorates with their own dynasties and relatively small European settler populations. Their independence could be presented as a negotiated adjustment. Algeria’s place in France was quite different. Algeria was legally divided into French départements, and roughly a million European settlers, the pieds-noirs, regarded it as home. They owned much of the best land and had real political weight in France. Giving up Algeria threatened both the identity of the French state and the security of a mobilized community, as well as French prestige abroad. Nationalist strength mattered, but the social composition of colonial rule mattered even more to the path taken. Where settlers held property and political power, compromise threatened concrete personal losses, and governments were willing to pay much higher military and moral costs to avoid it. Rhodesia and South Africa would show related patterns, each through its own institutions and ending.
Key places on the map
On this day
Why it happened
The canal and Egyptian authority. Washington’s withdrawal of its Aswan Dam loan left Nasser seeking another source of money. Nationalizing the canal offered revenue for the project and asserted Egyptian authority over Egyptian territory. Britain and France saw their prestige, oil supplies and route to Asia at stake. Control of the waterway thus became a test of whether European powers could still command events in the postcolonial world by force.
Financial pressure on Britain. Eisenhower opposed an invasion that had been concealed from Washington, and feared it would drive Arab states toward Moscow. British forces could succeed in the field, but Britain needed support for sterling and emergency oil. As the pound came under speculative pressure, the United States withheld both. Faced with currency collapse, Britain folded within days. Military strength had not removed its financial dependence on its ally.
France concentrates on Algeria. France granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 after relatively little struggle. Both were protectorates rather than settled French soil. Releasing them freed troops and legitimacy for the fight over Algeria, which Paris would not yield: it consisted of three French départements and housed a million pieds-noirs. French leaders gave up two possessions to concentrate on a third.
Nasser’s example travels. Three armies attacked Egypt, yet Nasser remained in power. His survival turned battlefield defeat into political victory and made him almost overnight a hero across the Arab and African world, and a model of militant, non-aligned nationalism. Radio Cairo’s “Voice of the Arabs” carried the example abroad. Egypt became a training ground and megaphone for liberation movements from Algeria to Angola.
THE TURNING POINT
Suez, November 1956. In November 1956 the invaders’ military plan worked flawlessly, but the political result was disastrous for them. Within a week their senior partner had forced them into a UN-supervised retreat. Historians treat Suez as the precise moment when the British and French empires ceased to be independent great powers. London and Paris thereafter had to reckon with Washington’s ability to end a colonial venture, and the pace of withdrawal accelerated.
What it changed
A lesson for London. Harold Macmillan had been Chancellor during Suez. As prime minister three years later, he told South Africa’s parliament that “the wind of change is blowing through this continent.” The subsequent British retreat from Africa reflected part of the crisis’s lesson: fighting to hold colonies against that tide could put the nation’s finances at risk.
Different exits in the Maghreb. France’s possessions in the Maghreb followed sharply different paths. Tunisia and Morocco became independent in 1956; Algeria was already two years into a war that lasted until 1962. The presence and political strength of settlers help explain the contrast, which returns in the next chapter.
A non-aligned alternative. Nasser, Nehru, Tito and Sukarno helped make the “Third World” a bloc outside both Cold War camps, offering allegiance in exchange for aid and arms. Over the next thirty years both superpowers courted, armed and subverted decolonizing African states. Their rivalry would make several later chapters of this atlas Cold War battlefields.
DISCUSSION QUESTION — Suez was a clear military victory for Britain and France. In what sense was it one of the most important defeats in the history of empire?
The canal was only part of the objective. Britain and France also sought to demonstrate that European powers could enforce their will in the postcolonial world. They retook the canal, then surrendered it under pressure from their own ally. American financial pressure left Britain unable to sustain the operation. Colonized peoples could see the metropole’s dependence on Washington; European cabinets could see that using force to retain empire could threaten national finances. The intended demonstration of authority had failed, and the pace of decolonization was visibly different before and after 1956.
An interesting fact
In May 1949 the Bevin–Sforza plan proposed dividing former Italian Libya into UN trusteeships administered by Britain, France and Italy. Its clause on Tripolitania fell one vote short of the General Assembly’s required two-thirds, and the plan collapsed. The vote most often credited with defeating it was cast by Haiti’s delegate, Émile Saint-Lôt. Two years later Libya became the first state created through the United Nations. An heir of the Haitian Revolution, from the world’s first Black republic, had helped open the way.
Related
THE FREE PRINTABLE STUDY GUIDE
Get the printable study guide for The Decolonization of Africa free. I’ll send you a few short letters, then one when a new atlas opens. That’s all. — Paul
NO TRACKING · YOUR ADDRESS IS USED FOR THE DISPATCH AND NOTHING ELSE · UNSUBSCRIBE ANYTIME