Was Munich a betrayal, a blunder or the best option?

The short answer

• The memory of war and fear of bombing. A generation after the trenches, British leaders had reason to dread another European war. Air power added a fear of cities being devastated at once. Baldwin’s warning that “the bomber will always get through” and the bombing of Guernica (Ch. 5) gave that fear force; air-staff forecasts for London predicted casualties about ten times those later experienced. Against such expectations, negotiating a border revision could seem a smaller price. The forecast was mistaken about 1938, but the fear was intelligible.
• A real grievance used for conquest. Sudeten Germans had entered Czechoslovakia without choosing that state in 1919. The Depression struck their region hard, and Czech policy had only partly addressed their complaints. Many British officials also believed Versailles had treated Germany unfairly. A concession might therefore seem a way to meet a legitimate grievance and distinguish reasonable demands from conquest. Hitler and Henlein’s party used those same grievances to intensify a crisis whose aims went beyond minority rights.
• The disputed military balance. Britain could not send an army to Bohemia, Chamberlain’s advisers said, and needed roughly two years to prepare its air defenses. Time for radar and Spitfires mattered. Yet Czechoslovakia had roughly thirty-five divisions behind mountain fortifications, and France had a hundred divisions facing five German ones in the west. Officers around Beck and Halder discussed a coup if Hitler brought war. Division counts alone do not settle readiness, deployment or political will, and the coup was never tested. Britain improved its defenses in the year gained, but Germany armed faster and acquired Czech weapons. Many historians judge the exchange unfavorable; the leaders deciding in 1938 lacked the German archives later scholars could consult.
• France and its British ally. France had promised to support Prague since 1924; Britain had no equivalent treaty. The French decision nevertheless depended heavily on London. French planning was defensive, politics were divided, and Daladier, though doubtful that Hitler’s ambitions were limited, judged that France could not fight without Britain. Returning to Le Bourget, he reportedly expected an angry reception. When crowds cheered instead, he is said to have murmured “the fools”.

What it changed

Czech arms in German hands. The loss of Czech defenses and industry changed the forces available for a later war. Germany acquired further military resources when it occupied Prague in March 1939. Czech-built 35(t) and 38(t) tanks formed a significant part of its force against France in 1940; the original estimate puts their share at about a third. The territory given up at Munich had helped strengthen the enemy Britain was buying time to face.

Soviet distrust deepens. Munich reinforced Stalin’s fear that Western powers might direct Hitler eastward: the Soviet Union had been excluded from the settlement. In May 1939 Molotov replaced Litvinov, the Jewish foreign minister who had advocated collective security. Berlin received the signal. Munich was one influence on the road to the Nazi–Soviet Pact, discussed in Chapter 8.

Britain issues guarantees. Prague changed Chamberlain’s policy within a weekend. Britain guaranteed Poland, then Romania and Greece, seeking to deter further aggression. The commitments were easier to issue than direct military help would be to deliver. Their effectiveness depended in part on whether Hitler believed Britain would act.