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WWI · NOV 1916

Was attrition in WWI a rational strategy?

The seminar question: “Could attrition be a rational strategy in 1916?”

In 1916 both sides turned to attrition. Germany attacked Verdun, which France felt bound to defend, and the battle exhausted both armies. The Allies attacked on the Somme partly to relieve Verdun; its first day was the bloodiest in British military history. In the east, Brusilov shattered the Austro-Hungarian armies.

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Map of Verdun, the Somme and Brusilov (Nov 1916)
NOV 1916 · THE GREAT WAR, 1871–1923

Why did Germany choose Verdun? The fortress city had political and emotional importance for France, and Falkenhayn expected the French to fight for it. His later memorandum described an intention to drain French manpower, although historians dispute the document and its relation to his original plan. The French did defend Verdun, but German losses mounted too. Pétain kept supplies moving along the road to the city and rotated divisions through the battle, spreading its burden across much of the French army.

The short answer

THE TURNING POINT

Verdun holds; German command changes. By July the fighting at Verdun had failed to produce the favorable exchange associated with Falkenhayn's later account. He was dismissed in August. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, celebrated for their victories in the east, replaced him and acquired decisive influence over Germany's war effort. They pressed the “Hindenburg Programme” of mobilization at home and soon supported unrestricted submarine warfare. The change mattered far beyond the fortress: different leaders would now decide how far Germany should gamble.

What it changed

Losses and resources. The estimated losses are staggering: roughly 300,000 dead at Verdun, another 300,000 on the Somme, and perhaps a million Austro-Hungarian and Russian casualties in the east. Romania was overrun, while the western lines moved only kilometers. The resources left to continue the war also mattered. Germany ended 1916 outnumbered and blockaded, with the “turnip winter” beginning and a weakened ally to support. The Entente's greater resources would count over time, although its own armies had paid heavily for the pressure.

A weakened Habsburg ally. After Brusilov's offensive, Austria-Hungary depended increasingly on German divisions and command. Emperor Franz Joseph died in November 1916; within months his successor Karl secretly approached the French about peace. The empire that had helped start the war could no longer fight it alone. Its dependence forms part of the story of its rapid dissolution in 1918.

The survivors carry the war forward. Much of the French army had passed through Verdun. Many of those soldiers would face Nivelle's 1917 offensive and the mutinies that followed in part of the army. Veterans of the Somme carried costly experience into the BEF of 1918. The war also shaped later leaders: Charles de Gaulle was wounded and captured at Verdun, and Pétain commanded its defense. Their later decisions belonged to lives marked by the fighting of 1916.

The full answer, argued

The case for attrition begins with the difficulty of breaking the western front (Chapter 5). The Entente could maintain pressure with greater combined resources, including through blockade, and German manpower was under severe strain by 1918. But a sound expectation about the long war did not make any particular attack sound. Verdun showed that commanders could not dictate the exchange of casualties; prolonged losses also damaged Russian and part of French morale before Germany's defeat. An offensive must be judged by its methods, likely gains, losses and alternatives. Superior resources do not make the people committed to battle interchangeable.

An interesting fact

Audiences saw The Battle of the Somme while the battle was still being fought. Official cameramen Geoffrey Malins and John McDowell supplied the footage, and the film opened on 21 August 1916. It reportedly sold around twenty million tickets in six weeks, bringing images of actual dead and wounded to an audience approaching half of Britain. Its most familiar sequence, men going “over the top,” was almost certainly staged at a trench-mortar school behind the lines: filming an actual assault head-on was exceptionally difficult.

This is the study layer of Verdun, the Somme and Brusilov, chapter 7 of The Great War, 1871–1923; the full index of the atlas is here.

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