Russian Revolution · CHAPTER 4 ·
February Revolution
Chapter 4 of The Russian Revolution, 1855–1924: “The War Breaks the State”
Russia entered the First World War in 1914 unable to arm or supply its armies, and Tannenberg, the Great Retreat of 1915 and more than 1.8 million dead followed. In February 1917 bread queues in Petrograd swelled into strikes, the garrison deserted the regime, and Nicholas II abdicated at Pskov on 2/15 March.
Chapter 4 is included with every paid plan. WW2 is free in full, and chapter 1 of every atlas is free. A free account opens 3 more chapters a day. Starter, at $9 a month, opens all 21 with no daily limit — see the plans.
Free printable Russian Revolution study guide, sent by email ↓
The map above is the world of Russia, March 1917 — The Tsar abdicates.
Every state on the map that year: The world in 1918 · Europe in 1918.
Part of IB History: The Russian Revolution →
SHORT EXPLANATION
Russia entered the First World War in 1914 able to mobilize more men than it could arm. One army was encircled at Tannenberg, and in 1915 the Great Retreat gave up Poland and Lithuania. The war strained the cities as well as the front. Railways could not carry enough food and soldiers at the same time; grain remained in the countryside while people queued for bread. Printing money to pay for the war sent prices sharply upward.
Nicholas II took personal command at the front in 1915, tying the throne to defeat while leaving a discredited court in the capital. In February 1917 Petrograd's bread queues became strikes. The government ordered the garrison to fire, but its reservists, who feared being sent to die at the front, changed sides. The Tsar had lost the force needed to restore order. At Pskov, his generals told him the army would not fight for him, and he abdicated. Three centuries of Romanov rule ended when its expected defenders withdrew their support.
The full story
Russia sent millions of men to fight in the First World War, but often lacked the rifles and shells to equip them. More than 1.8 million military personnel died. At Tannenberg in 1914 one army was destroyed; the Great Retreat of 1915 cost Russia Poland and Lithuania. The following year Brusilov struck Austria-Hungary hard, but his offensive also consumed Russian reserves the empire could ill afford to lose.
A defeat need not bring down a government. Russia's difficulty was sustaining the war as losses mounted. The railways had to move troops to the front and grain to the cities, yet could not carry enough of both. Inflation made peasants reluctant to sell grain for money that was losing value. Food existed in the empire while people in Petrograd went hungry.
Nicholas made the war his personal responsibility when he went to headquarters to take command in 1915. Military setbacks now fell directly on the crown, and he was absent from the capital. There the government was associated with Rasputin, the peasant faith-healer and court favorite whose influence at the palace attracted contempt. His murder late in 1916 did nothing to repair the larger failures of government and supply.
In February 1917 bread protests became strikes, and crowds filled Petrograd's streets. No party had planned the rising. The garrison contained many reservists who were close to the workers and feared being sent to the front. Ordered to shoot, soldiers refused and armed the crowd. The force on which the government depended to clear the streets had joined them.
Nicholas's train was stopped at Pskov. Every front commander advised him to go, and he abdicated on 2 March. The Provisional Government of liberal notables took control of the ministries; the Petrograd Soviet, a council of workers' and soldiers' deputies, held the loyalty of the streets. The fall of the monarchy had left two centers of authority whose relationship would shape the year ahead.
FULL EXPLANATION
War as a test of state capacity
A country can survive military defeat if it can replace equipment, feed its cities, sustain credit and persuade people that further sacrifice has a purpose. Russia had difficulty coordinating all these tasks at once. Trains carrying troops had less room for food; urban shortages encouraged strikes. Inflation meanwhile made peasants reluctant to sell grain for money that was losing its value. Historians debate whether the wartime economy was approaching absolute exhaustion or suffering chiefly from a breakdown of distribution and confidence. The distinction matters when grain remained in the country while queues in the capital grew. The political problem was how to respond. Nicholas had taken command himself, attaching military setbacks to the crown, and the autocracy had neither a parliament nor a trusted ministry able to absorb blame and reorganize policy. The war exposed failures in the institutions needed to sustain it.
Why the garrison’s choice was decisive
In 1905 crowds had challenged the government without bringing it down. In February 1917 the decisive difference came when soldiers refused to disperse demonstrators and gave them weapons. Many members of the Petrograd garrison were reservists awaiting deployment, close to workers in their social background and frightened of the front. Their decision deprived the government of a reliable force in the capital, although it did not mean every army unit supported revolution. Senior generals, treating Nicholas as an obstacle to continuing the war, then advised him to abdicate. This sequence gives substance to the “leaderless revolution” description. No party directed the first uprising, and Bolshevik leaders were in exile or Siberia. Yet the crowds acted in a society already shaped by strikes, socialist organization and the soviet of 1905. The state lost its armed support before anyone had agreed on institutions capable of giving the popular movement political form.
Key places on the map
Why it happened
A war the state could not supply. Russia could call millions of men to arms, but industry and transport could not supply a modern war adequately. Rifles and shells ran short while trains had to carry both soldiers and food. More than 1.8 million military deaths showed the cost throughout the country and helped produce a garrison unwilling to march.
The Tsar takes command. Nicholas assumed supreme command in 1915, making the war's fortunes inseparable from his own. Each retreat now reflected on the monarch, who was away from the capital as it slipped into chaos. The government he left behind, discredited by the Rasputin scandal, lacked respect and obedience.
Cities starved while grain rotted. Petrograd ran short of bread even though grain remained in the empire. Inflation discouraged peasants from selling for depreciating money, and the railways could not move enough food to the cities. By February the hungry capital also contained armed reservists whose obedience to the government was in doubt.
A monarchy that had run out of defenders. The groups Nicholas needed had different complaints. Liberals sought a real parliament, generals competent government, workers bread, and peasants land and peace. When his position was tested in 1917, no significant group, including the high command, was willing to fight to keep him. His authority depended on defenders who had withdrawn their support.
THE TURNING POINT
Abdication at Pskov, 2/15 March 1917. At Pskov, Nicholas needed an army willing to restore order in Petrograd. Instead, every front commander advised him to go. Their telegrams settled the dynasty's fate on 2/15 March 1917. The revolution had not defeated the army in battle; the army's commanders declined to defend the Tsar. The force on which his rule relied was no longer available to him.
What it changed
Dual power is born the same week. The Provisional Government of liberal notables held the ministries and claimed legal authority. At the same time, the Petrograd Soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies had the loyalty of the streets and the garrison. Neither could govern without the other, yet their aims were opposed. This division of authority shaped the course of 1917.
Order No. 1 dissolves the old army. The Soviet's first decree sought to protect the revolution from a counter-coup. It directed soldiers to elect committees and obey officers only when the Soviet agreed. That protection also weakened the old army's discipline. Millions of armed peasants in uniform would increasingly head home toward land.
A dynasty gone, with no plan for what replaces it. The people who inherited power were as surprised as the crowd and had made no preparations to govern. Their authority came from the emergency, and they remained committed to a war the crowd would not fight. The vacuum they could not fill would later give Lenin an opening.
DISCUSSION QUESTION — Was February 1917 a revolution the people made, or a collapse the regime brought on itself — the “leaderless revolution” thesis?
Both descriptions capture part of February. No party organized the first rising, and Bolshevik leaders in exile or Siberia were as surprised as anyone. In that sense it was spontaneous and leaderless: the state lost the loyalty of soldiers it needed and fell. But people acted within a history of underground organization, the example of 1905, deliberately encouraged war-weariness and workers' experience of strikes. These helped give the collapse political form. Mass anger became decisive when the regime's coercive core defected; the next question was who could fill the vacuum. In February no one was ready. By October someone was.
An interesting fact
Nicholas first abdicated in favor of his son Alexei. His physician then confirmed that Alexei, who had hemophilia, could not live apart from his parents. That evening Nicholas rewrote the manifesto in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. Approached in a Petrograd apartment the next morning and told his safety could not be guaranteed, Michael declined the crown unless a constituent assembly offered it. Russia had arguably had another tsar for about a day: “Michael II” was never crowned, and jurists doubted whether he was legally tsar at all. The dynasty ended in two abdications.
Related
THE FREE PRINTABLE STUDY GUIDE
Get the printable study guide for The Russian Revolution free. I’ll send you a few short letters, then one when a new atlas opens. That’s all. — Paul
NO TRACKING · YOUR ADDRESS IS USED FOR THE DISPATCH AND NOTHING ELSE · UNSUBSCRIBE ANYTIME