Cold War · CHAPTER 6 ·
Cuban Missile Crisis
Chapter 6 of The Cold War, 1945–1991: “Cuba: To the Brink”
Once the botched Bay of Pigs landing pushed Cuba to Moscow, Khrushchev secretly placed missiles ninety miles from Florida. A U-2 photographed the sites in October 1962, and Kennedy chose a naval quarantine over airstrikes. The crisis ended with a US pledge not to invade Cuba and a secret US withdrawal of missiles from Turkey.
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SHORT EXPLANATION
In 1962 Khrushchev had reason to protect Cuba and reason to value its position. American hostility and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion had pushed Castro toward Moscow; the United States also held a wide lead in strategic missiles and had weapons in Turkey near the Soviet Union. Missiles placed secretly in Cuba, ninety miles from Florida, could narrow that gap. A U-2 reconnaissance flight photographed the sites in October.
For thirteen days the leaders confronted the possibility of nuclear war. Kennedy rejected his commanders’ call for immediate airstrikes and chose a naval “quarantine,” giving diplomacy time. The Soviet missiles were withdrawn, the United States publicly pledged not to invade Cuba, and a separate secret agreement provided for the removal of American missiles from Turkey. Judgment made a settlement possible, but events outside the leaders’ control show how much depended on luck as well.
The full story
Cuba offered Khrushchev an answer to two problems. After the revolution, American hostility and the failed Bay of Pigs landing in 1961 had pushed Castro toward Moscow, yet another invasion seemed possible. Soviet missiles could help protect the island. They could also change the strategic balance: the USSR had many medium-range missiles, and from Cuba, ninety miles from Florida, those weapons could reach the United States.
The deployment had to remain secret long enough to become effective. That was a formidable condition on an island watched from the air, with tens of thousands of troops and enormous missile trailers to conceal. In October 1962 a U-2 photographed the launch sites. Kennedy now had to decide how to remove the threat without starting a war.
For thirteen days his Executive Committee weighed the options as Soviet ships approached the American quarantine line. Airstrikes might destroy missiles, but Soviet personnel would be killed and Moscow might respond in ways neither leader could control. A naval blockade put pressure on Khrushchev more slowly. He would have to decide whether to challenge it, while both governments had time to seek a settlement.
Not every danger was visible to the men negotiating. On 27 October a U-2 was shot down over Cuba, another strayed toward Soviet airspace, and the submarine B-59, out of radio contact and shaken by depth charges, came close to firing a nuclear torpedo. Flotilla commander Vasili Arkhipov withheld the consent needed to launch. The settlement removed Soviet missiles from Cuba and included an American pledge not to invade; a separate secret agreement provided for withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey.
Both capitals emerged shaken. In June 1963 they agreed on a direct teletype link; in August they signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The arms race continued, but the rivals had begun to establish ways to manage dangers they had just experienced at close quarters.
FULL EXPLANATION
How the quarantine made time for a bargain
An airstrike might have brought military reactions into play almost immediately. The quarantine exerted pressure more slowly: as Soviet ships approached, Khrushchev had to decide whether to challenge it, and the governments could exchange messages about a settlement. The name “quarantine” did not settle the legal difficulty, since a formal blockade has traditionally been treated as an act of war. But the measure let Washington raise or ease pressure while negotiations continued. The bargain also needed something Moscow could accept. Privately, Kennedy agreed to remove the obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey. This was a real concession, though keeping it separate from the public terms avoided the appearance of a direct swap and protected allied confidence. Secrecy had another consequence: it concealed how the compromise worked, helping sustain the story that firmness alone forced the Soviet retreat. Force, communication, and an acceptable exit worked together. They created more opportunities for restraint without removing the danger.
What B-59 shows about deterrence
An account of deterrence can make the crisis seem like a contest between leaders who understand the threats and control their forces. The crew of B-59 experienced it differently. They had lost contact with Moscow, suffered extreme heat, and could not tell whether American practice depth charges were signals or an attack. A nuclear torpedo required the agreement of three officers; Arkhipov withheld his consent. On the same day, one U-2 was shot down over Cuba and another accidentally flew toward Soviet airspace. Neither incident had been ordered by Kennedy or Khrushchev. Did deterrence succeed, or did the world survive through luck? Historians debate the question, and both belong in the explanation. Kennedy slowed escalation and Khrushchev accepted a compromise, while individuals also had to deal with events their governments had not anticipated. Institutions can give restraint more chances to work; they cannot remove chance from complex weapons systems.
Key places on the map
On this day
Why it happened
Why Khrushchev sent the missiles. Moscow faced a strategic imbalance: it had 26 reliable ICBMs against hundreds of American bombers and missiles, including weapons stationed from Turkey to Britain. The Soviet Union possessed many medium-range missiles, but they could not reach the United States from Soviet territory. Cuba changed their reach. Khrushchev also feared a second, more serious invasion of the island and saw the deployment as protection for Castro. Both purposes depended on keeping the operation secret long enough for the missiles to become effective. With some 40,000 troops and 100-foot missile trailers exposed to aerial surveillance, that was a fragile plan.
What the Bay of Pigs taught the leaders. The failed April 1961 invasion left Castro expecting another attack and looking for protection. Khrushchev drew a different lesson: Kennedy could be pressured. Their Vienna summit reinforced that impression; Kennedy later said, “he savaged me,”. Kennedy had his own reason to reconsider confident advice after the Bay of Pigs. In October 1962 his advisers did not know that Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were already on Cuba, where an invasion urged by the chiefs could have encountered them.
Pressure with time to decide. An airstrike would probably kill Soviet soldiers immediately, putting Moscow under pressure to respond. The blockade worked at a different pace. Soviet ships could approach, and Khrushchev would have to choose whether to challenge the line; meanwhile both sides could consider alternatives. Washington called it a “quarantine,” since a formal blockade raised the legal problem of an act of war. ExComm could adjust pressure while leaving an exit open. Compare the Yalu in Chapter 4, where the momentum of military success helped shape policy. Here the speed of events was itself a choice.
THE TURNING POINT
27 October, aboard B-59. For days B-59 had been out of radio contact. Its batteries were failing, the temperature reached 45°C, and crew members fainted. American practice depth charges shook the submarine; the crew could not know they were meant as signals. The captain ordered a nuclear torpedo readied: “We’re going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all.” Three officers had to agree to launch. Flotilla commander Vasili Arkhipov, aboard because of his position, withheld consent. Far from either capital, an exhausted officer’s decision had become part of the crisis’s outcome.
What it changed
A link and a limit on tests. After the crisis, both governments sought ways to handle future confrontations. The direct teletype link agreed in June 1963 made faster communication possible. In August the Limited Test Ban Treaty ended atmospheric nuclear testing among its parties. These measures helped establish an arms-control practice that later included SALT, the ABM Treaty, and INF. The arms race went on, but its participants had begun to agree on limits to particular dangers.
The rivals draw different lessons. Washington saw grounds for confidence in resolve backed by flexible options. Moscow saw the disadvantage of negotiating from weakness. A Soviet diplomat told an American counterpart, “you Americans will never be able to do this to us again,”. The USSR expanded its naval and missile forces and reached approximate strategic parity by 1970. That buildup contributed both to stability in the 1970s and to the cost of the arms race in the 1980s.
Castro’s course after the settlement. The settlement protected Cuba from invasion, but Castro learned of the missile withdrawal from the radio. He had urged Khrushchev to accept nuclear war rather than retreat, and he resented being left out of a decision affecting his country. In the decades that followed he supported revolution abroad, from Bolivia to Angola, sometimes moving ahead of Moscow’s wishes. Soviet assistance did not make Cuba’s aims identical to those of its patron.
DISCUSSION QUESTION — Kennedy’s advisers split between airstrike and blockade. The airstrike faction lost — and later evidence suggests the airstrike would likely have triggered nuclear use. Was the outcome good judgment or good luck?
Both. Kennedy had read The Guns of August, and the Bay of Pigs had given him reason to doubt unanimous expert advice. By slowing the confrontation and privately offering to remove the Jupiters from Turkey, he gave Khrushchev an exit while accepting political cost himself. Yet neither president controlled every danger. Arkhipov happened to be aboard B-59; the stray U-2 escaped; and Khrushchev chose on Saturday night to accept the deal despite its humiliation. McNamara later said, “we lucked out”. The process was designed to give restraint more opportunities, but chance still mattered. How many comparable vulnerabilities might exist in nuclear arsenals today?
An interesting fact
The famous “red telephone” never existed. The hotline established after the crisis used a teleprinter: both sides distrusted spur-of-the-moment speech and wanted time for typing and translation. Its cable passed through London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki. Washington’s first test message, on 30 August 1963, was the typist’s pangram “THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPED OVER THE LAZY DOG’S BACK 1234567890”; Moscow replied with a lyrical description of the evening sun over its capital. The link first served in a real crisis during the Six-Day War of 1967.
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