Decolonization of Africa · CHAPTER 11 ·
End of apartheid
Chapter 11 of The Decolonization of Africa, 1945–1994: “The Four Years That Decided It”
Between 1990 and 1994 South Africa’s government and the ANC negotiated through the CODESA talks amid severe violence, including the Boipatong massacre of 1992 and Chris Hani’s assassination in April 1993. On 27 April 1994 about twenty million people voted, most for the first time, and a government of national unity followed.
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SHORT EXPLANATION
Mandela’s release in 1990 opened a negotiation over who would govern South Africa. The ANC could mobilize resistance that made apartheid ungovernable, but it could not take a state defended by powerful security forces. The government possessed those forces and the bureaucracy, yet could not indefinitely govern a majority it excluded or repair the economy. At CODESA, each side had reason to bargain: the government sought protections that could preserve a white veto, while the ANC wanted majority rule under a bill of rights.
Agreement remained precarious. After the Boipatong massacre in 1992, amid allegations of police complicity, the ANC suspended talks. A white extremist killed Chris Hani in April 1993, hoping to start a racial war; Mandela appealed for calm and the ANC pressed for a fixed election date. About twenty million people voted on 27 April 1994, most for the first time. Constitutional rights, temporary power-sharing and continuity for officials helped secure the handover, though the compromises also limited the pace of change.
The full story
Neither the apartheid government nor the ANC could obtain the future it wanted by force alone. The ANC could mobilize mass resistance and make the country ungovernable, but it could not seize the state. The government controlled the security forces and bureaucracy, yet could neither govern the excluded majority indefinitely nor restore the economy. Each could obstruct the other. That made negotiation worth attempting, although it gave neither side reason to trust the other with unchecked power.
At CODESA, the question was how to make a settlement safe. Government negotiators sought protections that could preserve a white veto; the ANC demanded majority rule secured by constitutional rights. Violence outside the talks made agreement harder. Hostel killings, train massacres and township attacks spread fear, while later investigations exposed the involvement of elements of the security forces in arming and encouraging violence. Bloodshed could be used to suggest that Black rule would bring chaos. In 1992 the Boipatong massacre, amid allegations of police complicity, led the ANC to break off negotiations. The very violence that made a settlement urgent also threatened to destroy it.
The assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993 brought another crisis. His killer, a white extremist, hoped to provoke a racial war. Mandela went on television to appeal for calm, and the ANC directed anger toward a fixed election date. This was an active political choice: instead of allowing the murder to set the terms of the transition, its leaders pressed for a vote that could settle who would govern.
On 27 April 1994 about twenty million people voted, most for the first time. The interim constitution provided a bill of rights and a government of national unity. Temporary power-sharing and continuity in the civil service and security forces gave people in the old state reasons to accept the handover; they also slowed redistribution and other changes. The later Truth and Reconciliation Commission sought public testimony and offered conditional amnesty for full disclosure of qualifying political crimes. Its balance between truth and accountability remains contested. Mandela and de Klerk had chosen settlement, but the agreement held through institutions and guarantees as well as leadership and restraint.
South Africa’s vote brings the atlas’s measure of political decolonization to 100 percent. The tide begins with Libya in 1951 and ends with the last transition from European or settler rule to an independent, majority-ruled state in the atlas. Scrub the timeline and nearly fifty years gather into one rising color. That measure shows a political transformation; it cannot settle every question about remaining territories or political freedom.
FULL EXPLANATION
Why neither side could impose victory
The ANC could mobilize mass resistance against apartheid, but taking a state defended by powerful security forces was another matter. The government held those institutions, yet lacked legitimacy among the majority and faced economic pressure. Conflict scholars call a situation in which both sides bear costs without an attainable victory a mutually hurting stalemate. Each has a reason to seek relief, but neither can assume the other will respect a concession. The interim arrangements addressed that fear through an election date, constitutional protections, temporary power-sharing and continuity for many officials. These guarantees made the transfer more credible to people in the old state. They also limited the speed of the structural change many liberation supporters wanted. Mandela and de Klerk had to persuade their constituencies to accept that trade-off; pressure made negotiation possible, while leadership and institutional design gave it a chance to succeed.
Violence, spoilers and restraint
A spoiler need not capture territory to endanger a negotiation. Violence can instead make the parties distrust one another and persuade their supporters that confrontation offers greater safety. This is the spoiler problem. Township massacres, covert support for armed factions and Hani’s murder threatened the South African talks in different ways. After Boipatong the ANC broke off negotiations; Hani’s assassination threatened a wider conflict. Mandela’s appeal for calm and the ANC’s organization gave anger a political direction, toward pressure for an election date. Thousands died in political violence during the transition. The survival of negotiations depended in part on people exercising restraint amid fear and grief.
Key places on the map
On this day
Why it happened
Two sides that could obstruct but not win. The ANC could make apartheid ungovernable through mass resistance, but could not simply take a state guarded by powerful security forces. The government held those forces and the bureaucracy, yet faced an excluded majority and an economy under pressure. Neither could impose a durable victory. Both therefore had reason to bargain, and Mandela and de Klerk had to persuade their supporters that compromise was safer than continued conflict.
The third force and the strategy of chaos. Hostel killings, train massacres and the arming of factions undermined confidence in the talks. Investigations traced some covert support for violence to elements of the security establishment. Such violence could make majority rule appear to mean anarchy and weaken trust between negotiators. Its sources and purposes were multiple, but the participation of people inside institutions responsible for protection made the threat to the settlement especially grave.
Hani’s murder and the response. The killer of Chris Hani in April 1993 hoped to ignite racial war. The country came close to the edge, arguably nearer than at any time since 1960. Mandela appealed to the nation for calm, while the ANC gave its supporters a political objective: a definite election date. Restraint was a deliberate response to the murder and its intended consequences.
The choice of truth and conditional amnesty. Apartheid left crimes and generations of dispossession to confront, while the old security forces retained weapons and influence. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission combined public testimony with amnesty for applicants who met conditions including full disclosure. The arrangement sought a stable settlement and a shared future, but its cost in accountability remains a subject of debate.
THE TURNING POINT
The election, 27 April 1994. On 27 April 1994 about twenty million people voted, most for the first time. Many queued for hours to exercise a right denied to the Black majority under apartheid. Four days later the count confirmed Mandela’s victory, and the last charcoal territory on the map turns red. From Ghana’s independence in 1957 to these queues, the atlas has followed struggles over who would rule. The peaceful handover in South Africa came after negotiations repeatedly threatened by violence.
What it changed
The map completes. The vote brings the atlas’s tide of independent, majority-ruled states to 100 percent. From Libya in 1951, nearly fifty years of political change appear as one rising color. The classification captures that transformation, though it cannot answer every question about remaining territories or political freedom.
A government of national unity. The interim settlement provided for five years of power-sharing and left much of the civil service and security establishment in place. Officials whose cooperation mattered had a stake in a stable handover, reducing the danger of collapse or a coup. The same continuity constrained the speed of transformation while apartheid’s inequalities endured. South Africans continue to debate the trade-off.
The debate over reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission became an influential example of transitional justice. Public testimony and conditional amnesty were intended to address abuses while reducing the danger of renewed conflict. Critics continue to ask whether enough truth emerged and whether too much accountability was sacrificed. The epilogue considers what political liberation leaves unresolved.
DISCUSSION QUESTION — The South African transition nearly collapsed in violence more than once. What helped it hold, and what can its experience teach us about ending entrenched conflicts?
The ANC and the government could obstruct each other without imposing a durable victory, so both had reason to seek an agreement. That did not decide its terms. Mandela and de Klerk had to persuade supporters to accept compromise, and after Boipatong and Hani’s murder, restraint and political pressure kept a route to settlement open. Temporary power-sharing and continuity for officials gave people in the old state a stake in the handover. The later amnesty process sought testimony about political crimes, at a contested cost in accountability. The experience suggests how leadership, credible guarantees and ways of addressing violence and the past can help a settlement survive; none makes survival certain.
An interesting fact
The 27 April 1994 ballot listed nineteen parties with names, symbols, colors and photographs of their leaders, helping voters identify their choices where apartheid had restricted education. Inkatha agreed to participate only a week before the vote, after tens of millions of ballots had been printed. Its entry was added by hand as a sticker at the foot of each paper.
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