Why did Russia’s army collapse in 1917 but not France’s?

The short answer

• Russia’s collapsing authority. By taking personal command of the army in 1915, the Tsar tied his authority to its fortunes. Military failures damaged him directly, while court politics, Rasputin and a German-born Tsarina encouraged rumors of treason. Inflation and failing railways made food harder to obtain. A regime demanding total-war sacrifices could not reliably supply its cities. When strikes spread and soldiers refused to suppress them, the monarchy lacked the authority to survive.
• Why the government continued the war. The Provisional Government inherited commitments as well as a war. It depended on Entente credit, had treaties and alliance obligations, and hoped for territorial gains including Constantinople. Its leaders also believed a free Russia might fight better. These reasons explain the decision to continue, but they did not make an exhausted army accept another defeat. The Bolshevik promise of “Peace, land, bread” addressed needs the government had not satisfied, and fighting on made that alternative more compelling.
• What French soldiers refused. Many French soldiers drew a line between defending their country and taking part in another offensive. They held trenches, asked for leave, rest and better tactics, and some sang the Internationale. Pétain could respond to these demands while keeping France in the war. In Russia, similar complaints arose amid a collapsed monarchy and a contest between the Provisional Government and the soviets. The state behind an army affected both what soldiers could ask for and whom they could trust to answer.
• Two ways through the line. At Caporetto, infiltration troops followed the barrage, bypassed strongpoints and gave junior leaders initiative to move through the defenses. At Cambrai, tanks crushed wire and crossed trenches without the prolonged bombardment that would alert defenders. Both methods made openings. Both also exposed the difficulty of exploiting them: infantry and unreliable machines could outrun the guns and supplies needed to sustain an advance. The campaigns of 1918 would test how far armies could carry and defend such gains.

What it changed

Germany’s opportunity. Russia’s exit released some fifty German divisions for transfer west. Germany thus gained a narrow opportunity to attack before American armies arrived in force. Chapter 11 follows its gains in the east; Chapter 12 follows its gamble in the west.

American resources. American entry gave the Allies credit, expanded shipping and the prospect of millions of troops. Loans eased their financial crisis, and shipbuilding helped replace losses to U-boats. Waiting could therefore strengthen the Allied position. Pétain’s “wait for the Americans and the tanks” expressed a strategy for holding out until that help arrived.

Rival visions of peace. The rival governments offered different answers to what peace should bring. Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918 called for open covenants and self-determination; Lenin’s Decree on Peace called for immediate peace and revolutionary change. These programs raised expectations among peoples affected by settlements from Brest-Litovsk to Versailles, who could measure the terms imposed on them against those promises.